The era of tanks is ending. How and why Ukraine wants to bring them back to the battlefield
Tanks and armored vehicles in general are rapidly losing their role on the battlefield in the Russian-Ukrainian war. This is happening due to the prevalence of cheap and effective drones, particularly fiber-optic ones, which prevent this equipment from even approaching the front line, let alone performing effective combat operations. However, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is determined to reverse the trend of "tank vulnerability" in the near future, the Ukrainian Service of the BBC reports .

The protection of armored vehicles with special metal "hoods" (pictured) or "mangals" has become a necessary condition to extend their lifespan on the battlefield. Photo: 153rd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Modern armed conflicts around the world are increasingly turning into "drone wars". Cheap and effective, they are pushing expensive heavy armored vehicles to the periphery of combat operations. Some military experts even speak of the "end of the tank era", emphasizing that this weapon belongs to "past wars" and in modern confrontations, they are turning from an advantage into a burden. However, this position is not shared by the Ukrainian general staff.
Evolution of Protection
More than four years of full-scale war in Ukraine have significantly "thinned out" the number of tanks on both sides. For example, Ukrainian General Staff estimates show that as of June 3, Russia has lost almost 37,000 units of armored vehicles: about 12,000 tanks and 24,700 armored combat vehicles.
According to the international analytical project Oryx, Ukraine has lost almost 6,000 units of armored vehicles during the war, including about 1,400 tanks. These are huge figures, dozens of times exceeding the total amount of armored weapon systems, for example, of large European countries such as France and Germany.
Now, to protect themselves from drones, military personnel from both Russia and Ukraine usually have to cover armored vehicles with massive metal structures — the so-called "mangals" (barbecues).

In some cases, an excess of external protection turns equipment into "Tsar-mangals" or "tank-barns". Pictured is one such example on a Russian armored vehicle. Photo: "Voennyy Osvedomitel" (Military Informant)
Often clumsy and unsightly, they at least provide a chance to deliver personnel to positions, enduring several hits from FPV drones. However, these monstrous structures significantly affect the mobility and effectiveness of tanks and other "armor".
This is despite the fact that they are currently used primarily not for offensive operations, but for defensive ones or as an artillery substitute, firing from covered positions. This is when a tank fires not with direct aiming, but by coordinates on a plane from cover, minimizing the risk of a retaliatory strike from the enemy.
Moreover, even such operations are conducted mainly at dusk or in bad weather, to minimize the risk of detection by enemy reconnaissance drones.
It's time to change tank protection and the ways it is used in modern warfare, experts and military command believe.
The End of the "Mangal" Era
"All these 'mangals' are a temporary solution. There is no point in increasing them any further," an interlocutor in the Ukrainian military command told the Ukrainian Service of the BBC.
The thing is, such structures significantly limit the effectiveness and the very essence of armored vehicle combat operations. They lose speed, maneuverability, and cannot effectively support infantry advances on the battlefield. Additionally, further increasing external protection — those very lattice roofs over the tank's turret, "wigs" made of wires, or welded metal plates on the sides — can lead to overloading and breakdown of the machine.
Mykola Salamakha, an expert in armored vehicle armament, says that such external protection already weighs about 3 tons. This is close to the limit where a tank will cease to function normally.
"For light armored vehicles — MT-LB, BMP, BTR — this (external protection. — Ed.) should not exceed 1.5-2 tons; for heavy equipment, i.e., tanks, not more than 5 tons," he explains in a conversation with the Ukrainian Service of the BBC. "Further on, problems with the chassis, suspension, transmission, and engine power begin. That is, increasing 'mangals' indefinitely is impossible."
Another problem is that the protective structures of armored vehicles are not standardized — each unit makes them as they wish and according to their own ideas about effective protection.

Ukrainian armored vehicle "Kozak" of the 5th Separate Heavy Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The vehicle is almost completely covered by a special protective structure. Photo: 5th SHMB AFU
Although in the first years of the full-scale war, Ukrainian specialists tried to develop a unified "hood" for armored vehicles. It was a complex metal structure made of nets that covered the upper part of the vehicle. However, the issue of their mass use ran into problems with the quality of production and materials, says Mykola Salamakha.
"For it to work absolutely correctly, these nets must be non-combustible, meaning they should not catch fire from an explosive ordnance, and not pose a danger to the object they are protecting. They must also withstand multiple hits from different directions," he says.
According to the specialist, Ukrainian tank crews are currently designing external "armor" protection based on available materials and their own experience. There is no talk yet of creating kits that will be absolutely suitable for all tanks and armored vehicles in general.
An interlocutor with the Ukrainian Service of the BBC in the AFU command says that the first models of "mangals" are long outdated, as they protect tanks only from above, while in recent years, the number of hits on the lower part of armored vehicles has rapidly increased. This is done primarily with the help of maneuverable fiber-optic FPV drones or even UGVs (unmanned ground vehicles).
"Game Changer" of the War?
If further passive defense buildup is impossible, then it is necessary to switch to active protection of armored vehicles. The discussion is about creating a Ukrainian APS (Active Protection System), which would itself track and destroy attacking drones (and other threats) at a distance. This would allow "armor" to be brought back into the "kill zone" at the front, establish logistics, and even attempt to return to long-forgotten practices of mechanized assaults.
"Currently, our focus is on an active protection system for equipment. Without it, it is impossible to restore the maneuverability of troops," a representative of the AFU high command told the Ukrainian Service of the BBC.
According to him, Ukrainian developers already have promising solutions that need to be tested and brought to practical use in the near future.
These defense systems, he stressed, concern not only heavy armor but also UGVs, which have been widely used for logistics at the front in recent months. However, a significant portion of them are destroyed in the "kill zone" by enemy UAV strikes, so the issue of increasing their survivability is acute.

A Russian fiber-optic FPV drone attacks a Ukrainian tank during battles in the Kursk region, January 2025. Photo: EPA
In early May, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, Brigadier General Andriy Lebedenko, stated that the Ukrainian APS could become a "game changer" of the war.
"Today, the direction of active protection of weaponry and military equipment from enemy attack drones is critically important. We are looking for effective solutions. We must move towards intelligent defense systems, rather than simply increasing armor on heavy equipment," he said during the Drone Autonomy 2026 conference.
The Deputy Commander-in-Chief noted that it is necessary to combine both drone detection and identification means, and their engagement means, into a single system.
"We already have separate elements — net launchers, smart turrets — but they are not integrated into a single system. It is such an integrated system that can become the game changer that will alter the course of the war," General Lebedenko stated.
What is APS
Active Protection Systems (APS) are systems that include radar stations (RLS) or optical stations for detecting aerial threats, a computing system that tracks, identifies, and calculates engagement trajectories, and launchers or turrets that fire interceptors to shoot down threats on approach.
However, these systems began to be developed when the main threats to "armor" were anti-tank grenades and guided missiles. But how to protect large tanks from small drones is an unsolved problem that is currently being actively worked on not only by Ukrainian military specialists but also by those in other countries, particularly Russia, the USA, Germany, and Israel.
The latter has made the most progress in this matter, creating APS systems such as Trophy and Iron Fist. They have already undergone battlefield tests during combat operations in the Middle East. Developed in the early 2000s, they demonstrate high effectiveness against missiles and grenades, but their use in modern conditions against FPV drones has shown significant problems.

An American Abrams tank with the installed Israeli Trophy active protection system. It performed excellently against missiles and grenades but proved not very effective for protection against drones. Photo: Rafael.co.il
Indeed, many videos can be seen on social media showing the unhindered destruction of Israeli Merkava tanks, protected by the Trophy system, by Hezbollah militant drones during battles in Lebanon. The active protection system, apparently, simply does not manage to prevent these hits.
The main difficulty lies in the fact that it is hard for an APS to timely detect and correctly calculate the trajectory for engaging relatively slow, but maneuverable and small-sized FPV drones.
Furthermore, there is the question of ammunition. While Trophy has a reloading system, Iron Fist, conversely, does not, but can release its entire stock of interceptor projectiles to repel salvo fire. The other issue is that expending all interceptors on one salvo can effectively leave the vehicle defenseless against the next strike.
Manufacturers of defense-industrial complexes (DIC) from Germany and Russia have presented their promising anti-drone APS developments. However, none of them have yet proven their effectiveness directly on the battlefield.
Ukrainian Developments
Little is known about Ukrainian active protection systems. As noted by armored vehicle specialist Mykola Salamakha, a few years ago, domestic specialists created the "Zaslon" APS, but it was never adopted. According to him, the system had problems with accuracy, drive mechanics, and speed, and was also dependent on Western components.
"The production of similar systems is not established in Ukraine, and I don't think it will be established in the near future. Therefore, it's too early to talk about Ukraine being able to produce 'Zaslon' or at least its analogue in the near future," the expert believes.
In March 2026, the specialized publication Defense Express reported that the Ukrainian drone detection system I-SEE is being considered as the basis for a future Ukrainian active protection system for armored vehicles. This information was provided to the media by the developers of the system themselves.
I-SEE is a drone detection system based on the use of artificial intelligence and machine vision for visual UAV detection. It not only detects them but also provides automatic tracking of the acquired target, and subsequently — engagement with anti-drone means.
Representatives of the Ukrainian UGV "Zmey" manufacturer, Rovertech company, also announced the development of their own active protection system. According to their concept, sensors using artificial intelligence are supposed to detect drones around the UGV and fire net launchers at them.
Important nuances are that this APS must be inexpensive, but at the same time accurately identify the target, prevent false alarms, and have high hit accuracy.
If developers succeed in solving all problematic issues, as well as integrating their systems to work on mobile objects in complex combat conditions, then Ukraine could gain a significant advantage. This is not only about the safety of logistics and rotations but also about restoring tanks to their unique role in warfare.
"There is no other means, apart from a tank, to provide direct fire support to advancing infantry. Every infantry squad will not be able to support an advancing UAV crew that has 20-30 drones. There simply won't be that many crews. But a tank or an infantry fighting vehicle will have enough ammunition to ensure this task is performed," says Mykola Salamakha.
At the same time, he emphasizes:
"Another thing is that so far no one has found a method of operation and a method of protecting tank equipment to ensure its use on the scale it was 10-12 years ago."
In his opinion, this problem will certainly be solved, but not sooner than in 1-2 years.
Comments
А ў будучыні нават кіраваць не трэба - ШІ трэба будзе паставіць задачу, умоўна нанесьці максімальную шкоду пры гарантыі што танк застаецца на хаду і ўсё - толькі назіраць як рускія на гусеніцы наматываюцца. А калі рускія спрабуюць такі танк захапіць - самазнішчальны выбух.