Statkevich: Nuclear training in Belarus is a threat, primarily to Europe

"Oreshnik" system. Photo: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP

"If earlier Russian official propaganda could somehow still maintain in its consumers a belief in a quick victory over Ukraine, then after President Zelensky's mocking permission for a curtailed celebration of May 9, a date sacred to Russians, and a massive retaliatory strike by Ukrainian drones on Moscow, it became impossible to conceal the real state of affairs.

The authority of the Kremlin in the eyes of its subjects suffered a powerful blow, which in the eyes of the Kremlin inhabitants is both a disgrace and a threat. Perhaps these events will force them to assess the course and prospects of the war more realistically.

The main conclusion is that Ukraine has managed to shift the war to a different technological level, where, thanks to the help of its European allies, the energy of its free business, and the talent of its engineers, it is gaining an advantage.

It is not difficult to assess the prospects for the development of events. The error in assessing the motives of European countries, which from the beginning of the conflict were considered by Moscow only obedient puppets of Washington, leads to their support for Ukraine not stopping, regardless of the Kremlin's hopes for changes in America's position.

This means that financial, military, technological, and political assistance to Kyiv will only increase, regardless of Washington's position.

This means that Ukraine's technological advantage on the battlefield, relying on practically unlimited supplies of funds, electronic, and, if necessary, mechanical components, will only grow.

This means that Ukrainians will soon be able to neutralize Russia's numerical advantage, on which Moscow had so much hope, through aerial and ground drones.

This means that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able, already in the next winter season, to inflict unrestricted strikes with their own ballistic missiles on energy facilities in the Russian Federation, which, in the conditions of the Russian winter, much colder than the Ukrainian one, could lead to large-scale humanitarian catastrophes in Russia.

This means that Ukraine will soon be able to deploy its own orbital satellite constellations for reconnaissance and communication.

Ultimately, all this means a dead-end military situation for Moscow, if new, more effective options for continuing the war are not found there.

What could these options be:

1) Mobilization. But in the context of Ukraine's growing technological advantage on the battlefield, it can only lead to a sharp increase in combat losses, public dissatisfaction, emigration of men, increased costs for payments to families of the fallen, and a decrease in the number of people employed in the economy.

2) Expanding the line of combat engagements at the expense of Belarus. A repeat of the 2022 operation will not succeed due to the absence of the surprise factor and the readiness of the Ukrainian side. Forcing the Belarusian regime to participate in the war will not bring much benefit, because even an attack by all 23,000 ground troops of Belarus, in the absence of their combat experience, skills in mass combat use of drones, and the necessary number of drones themselves, will only lead to the destruction of oil refineries, nearby railway stations, and the blocking of supply routes for the invasion force. And as a result—to its destruction. Numerous "special forces" of internal troops, trained to disperse unarmed demonstrators and apprehend armed, drunken criminals with kitchen knives, will only increase the number of combat losses. Mass mobilization of people who largely desire political change can only lead to mass surrender or the transition of entire units to the opposite side, or even armed rebellions. In short, it's better not to try.

3) Use of tactical nuclear weapons. Threats of this have already been voiced on the eve of the May 9 parade. I have no doubt that Zelensky's "permission" for the May 9 parade has already been interpreted by Russian generals to their commander-in-chief as being forced by fear of the nuclear threat. Therefore, these threats will continue.

The Kremlin considers training for the combat use of nuclear weapons to be the most effective type of such threats. Usually, nuclear warheads in the Russian army, unlike NATO, are stored in centralized storage facilities, one of which was rapidly being built in Belarus near Krichaw.

Before their use, warheads are transported in columns of covered trucks under guard to their means of application—aircraft or missiles. This delivery itself is periodically rehearsed.

But such drills also have another meaning. The removal of something from centralized storage facilities is immediately detected by NATO countries' space reconnaissance assets. The question immediately arises as to what they are transporting—real warheads or their mock-ups. Everyone understands that the start of a nuclear attack will be masked as such a drill. Therefore, the drill itself is already a threat of nuclear attack. After the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Putin repeatedly announced such drills throughout Russia to frighten the West and force it to stop supporting Ukraine. But a nuclear drill only in Belarus is a threat, primarily to Europe. First and foremost, to Ukraine and neighboring NATO countries.

This threat does not concern the USA, because even a "Yars" modified to "Oreshnik" simply will not reach there from Belarus. This is done in the hope that under the current administration, America will not intervene in the event of a nuclear attack on European NATO countries or Ukraine. Under the previous administration, they would not have dared, but now they think it is possible. The peculiarity of frequent threats is that they lower the psychological threshold for their implementation and therefore sooner or later can be carried out. I already wrote about the consequences for Belarus and the threat to the Baltic states on this channel immediately after my release.

Now regarding the danger to Ukraine. In my opinion, two options for a nuclear strike on it are possible. Near the frontline, to demoralize or destroy defenses. But how to do this in Donbas, which, according to the Russian Constitution, is already considered part of the Russian Federation. To make a part of the Russian Federation uninhabitable—what then is the point of such "liberation"?

Or to strike at "decision-making centers," that is, to destroy the center and sanctuaries of "the mother of Russian cities." But what about the Russian historical myth? Sevastopol "new builds" don't count. And the monument to Prince Vladimir would have to be removed from Moscow.

Among other arguments against the strike is the complete international isolation of the Russian Federation, but it is already close to that. It is better not to mention moral limitations now.

I am forced to make such terrible predictions to reduce the likelihood of their realization. I would least of all want them to come true," concluded Mikalai Statkevich.

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