A scenario in which Russia gains a sense of victory in Ukraine is considered by Belarusian experts to be the most dangerous for Belarus

Alexander Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin, February 26, 2026. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov Pool Photo via AP

When the war in Ukraine finally ends, it will not automatically mean that Belarus will have a chance to return to normal relations with Europe. On the contrary, it is precisely after the cessation of hostilities that a new, no less difficult stage may begin for Minsk.

The discussion about the post-war security architecture in Europe has already moved beyond merely the Ukrainian issue. In the West, there is increasing discussion not only about how the war might end, but also what will happen after it, including with Belarus, which in recent years has become Russia's key military ally on its western flank.

These very questions are addressed in the study "Belarus after a possible peace settlement of the war in Ukraine: scenarios, risks, and opportunities for the European Union," prepared by experts from Belarusian analytical centers Sense Analytics (Artyom Shraibman), BEROC (Lev Lvovsky), and iSANS experts. Its authors do not attempt to predict the future. Instead, they propose three most likely scenarios for developments after a possible peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia and analyze what each of them would mean for Belarus, the European Union, and the entire security system in Eastern Europe.

At the same time, these scenarios are built on a number of assumptions that may not materialize. In particular, the researchers assume that Lukashenka will retain power and a stable system within Belarus. Although recent years have shown that events in the region can develop much faster than even the most cautious analysts predict.

The main conclusion of the study is quite simple: the end of the war does not mean the end of the Belarusian crisis, and the fate of Belarus will depend on the terms under which hostilities cease. Moreover, even after peace, the country may not become an independent player: it may remain heavily dependent on Russia in matters of security, economy, and politics.

After peace, Europe will face new challenges. How to contain Russia's military presence in Belarus? Is it possible to engage in dialogue with Minsk without legitimizing Lukashenka's regime? How to prevent the final detachment of Belarusian society from Europe? And what to do if the approaches of the USA and the EU to Belarus begin to diverge?

Three Possible Scenarios

Experts consider three basic scenarios for the development of events.

The first is the preservation of the status quo. The war continues until the end of 2026, the front line remains almost unchanged, and neither side is able to impose its terms on the opponent. The West continues to support Ukraine, but domestic political problems in the USA and Europe are beginning to play an increasingly important role. Sanctions against Russia and Belarus remain in place, and the main focus is on monitoring their implementation.

The second scenario is a "balanced agreement." It is considered the most favorable of the realistic options for Ukraine and its allies. Moscow concludes that continuing the war is becoming more costly than compromise. This could be facilitated by a slowdown in the Russian offensive, economic difficulties, continued Western support for Kyiv, and effective strikes against Russian military and energy infrastructure.

In this model, a truce is concluded by the end of 2026. Russia agrees to freeze the front line, Ukraine makes limited political concessions, for example, refusing to join NATO, but receives reliable security guarantees and access to an international recovery fund. At the same time, the West is not in a hurry to lift sanctions against Moscow.

The third scenario is an "agreement favorable to Russia." It assumes significantly less favorable terms for Kyiv. Ukraine loses the ability to continue the war due to a lack of military aid, and the US effectively persuades it to accept Russian demands. As a result, Kyiv renounces parts of the occupied territories, commits not to join NATO, and significantly reduces its armed forces. In such a case, Europe would also gradually soften pressure on Moscow, and some sanctions could be lifted.

Assessments Have Already Changed in a Few Months

During the presentation of the study, the authors acknowledged that the situation on the front has already changed since its preparation. While a few months ago the scenario of a "bad agreement" for Ukraine seemed more likely to them, now the assessments have become more optimistic.

Today, maintaining the status quo remains the most likely scenario. However, the "balanced agreement" scenario now appears more likely than a scenario in which Ukraine would be forced to accept unfavorable terms.

At the same time, experts acknowledge that recent months have brought a new threat, which is almost absent from the study. They do not rule out a scenario of horizontal escalation — where the war spreads to the territory of Belarus.

According to their assessments, such a risky option became more likely after Russia faced the necessity of addressing a new wave of mobilization. If the Kremlin takes this step, some new units could be transferred to Belarus — for training, maneuvers, or even for using Belarusian territory for new strikes against Ukraine. This is why the authors call this scenario a "bad status quo."

Павялічыць

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a visit to the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in the US, where components for artillery and mortar shells are produced, September 22, 2024. Photo: president.gov.ua

Economy: No Collapse, but No Growth Prospects Either

While the political consequences of a post-war settlement may differ significantly depending on the scenario, researchers are much more unequivocal about the economy: none of the possible options promises Belarus a significant economic breakthrough.

According to their estimates, the Belarusian economy has already passed its most difficult stage since the start of the full-scale war. After a sharp decline in 2022, it partially recovered thanks to the Russian market, but has effectively entered a phase of stagnation since approximately mid-2024.

The main growth factor in recent years has been Russian demand, which allowed Belarusian enterprises to partially compensate for the loss of European markets. However, this model is now beginning to exhaust itself. The Russian economy is slowing down, and consequently, demand for Belarusian goods is also weakening.

At the same time, labor shortages are becoming an increasingly serious problem. Enterprises are forced to raise wages to retain employees, but the possibilities for such growth are not endless.

Even the most favorable scenario for Belarus — a "balanced agreement" — does not open a quick path to economic recovery. The European Union, according to the study's authors, will not massively lift sanctions simply because the war has stopped.

Rather, a gradual reduction in so-called "sanction toxicity" can be expected: the opening of some checkpoints, the restoration of individual logistics routes, the easing of transport links, and limited expansion of trade. But this does not mean Belarus's return to the European market in the form it existed before 2020.

A completely different situation may arise if a post-war agreement is favorable to Russia. Then the USA and EU countries might opt for a partial easing of sanctions against Moscow, and along with it — against Minsk.

The paradox is that in such a case, Belarus could receive economic dividends not due to political changes within the country, but simply because the West will need a stable peace agreement with Russia. In other words, the Belarusian authorities could get sanctions relief without releasing political prisoners, without ending repression, and without reducing dependence on Moscow. It is this scenario that the authors consider one of the most dangerous for the entire sanctions policy of the European Union.

What Each Scenario Would Mean for Belarus

Despite the different options for ending the war, the researchers come to one common conclusion: none of the scenarios means a quick return of Belarus to normal relations with the West.

In all cases, Minsk will remain heavily dependent on Moscow. The difference will be in the depth of this dependence, the scale of repression, and the possibilities for limited dialogue with the European Union.

If the War Continues

If the situation on the front does not change significantly, Belarus will essentially remain in its current state. The European Union will continue to view it as Russia's closest ally. The main focus will no longer be on expanding sanctions, but on combating schemes for their circumvention.

The USA, according to the study, may continue a cautious selective dialogue with Minsk. It will primarily concern humanitarian issues — the release of political prisoners, the operation of the American embassy, or reducing the risk of further Belarusian involvement in the war. But there will be no talk of genuine normalization of relations.

Lukashenka himself will most likely also try to restore individual economic contacts with the West without changing his policies. He will continue to support Russia, but at the same time will seek opportunities to benefit from limited cooperation with Europe.

Within the country, analysts also do not expect significant changes. Repression will most likely continue, although its forms may become less demonstrative. Instead of new criminal cases, the authorities will more often use administrative persecution, dismissals, and other forms of pressure.

The main threat to regional security — Russia's military presence in Belarus — will also not change. At the same time, the authors of the study note an interesting detail. In their opinion, there is insufficient evidence to assert that Russian tactical nuclear weapons are already deployed in Belarus. For now, the Kremlin uses this topic primarily as an element of political and informational pressure. However, the researchers do not rule out the possibility of its actual deployment in the future.

Relations between Minsk and Kyiv will also remain minimal. Ukraine will continue to perceive Belarus as a military ally of Russia, so cooperation will be limited only to necessary technical and humanitarian contacts.

Павялічыць

War in Ukraine. Photo: Wolfgang Schwan Anadolu / Getty Images

If there is a Compromise Peace

The authors of the study consider the scenario of a "balanced agreement" to be the most promising for Belarus. But even in this case, they do not expect a sharp turn of the country towards the West.

Russian influence will not disappear. Belarus will remain part of the Russian security system, and its military dependence on Moscow will continue to determine Europe's attitude towards Minsk for a long time.

At the same time, it is this scenario that leaves the most room for cautious dialogue.

The European Union will most likely not massively lift sanctions, but may return to discussing individual practical issues. This could include opening additional checkpoints, restoring logistics routes, expanding humanitarian contacts, or the participation of European businesses in specific projects.

Political prisoners could become one of the main elements of such a dialogue. Experts do not rule out that Minsk will use their release as a subject for negotiations with the West. But it will most likely be about a gradual exchange of concessions, rather than radical political changes.

During the presentation of the study, the authors voiced a more optimistic assessment. While the study previously assumed that a significant number of political prisoners might remain behind bars by the end of 2026, experts now do not rule out that, with the most favorable developments, this problem could be largely resolved by the end of 2026 — beginning of 2027.

However, in their opinion, this will not mean the end of repression. Most likely, the state will simply change its form. Instead of mass political trials, targeted pressure, preventive detentions, administrative cases, and other control mechanisms, which are much harder to notice and document, will be used more actively.

A quick reconciliation with Ukraine should also not be expected. Even under the most favorable scenario, Kyiv will continue to perceive Belarus as a country through whose territory the Russian invasion took place. Therefore, it can only be about resuming individual transport, logistical, and humanitarian contacts, but not about genuine political partnership.

If the Agreement is Favorable to Russia

Researchers consider the most unfavorable scenario for Belarus to be one in which Russia gains a sense of victory, and the West seeks to normalize relations with Moscow as quickly as possible. In this case, Belarus risks becoming even more entrenched in the Russian sphere of influence.

The easing of sanctions could bring Minsk short-term economic benefits, but at the same time further increase its dependence on the Kremlin. Lukashenka would gain the opportunity to improve the country's economic situation without changing either its domestic policy or its relations with the West.

It is this scenario, the authors believe, that could become a serious test for the European Union itself.

The positions of its members are likely to diverge. Some states will insist on resuming economic cooperation with Belarus and Russia, citing the need for regional stabilization. Others, primarily the Baltic states and Poland, will believe that Belarus remains Russia's main military springboard on the western border.

Researchers do not rule out an increase in Russia's military presence either. After the cessation of hostilities, Moscow might transfer some units released from the Ukrainian front to Belarus, using them to create new military infrastructure, for regular exercises, or for permanent basing. For Ukraine, this would mean maintaining a high level of threat even after the war ends.

As the authors noted during the presentation, in any of the scenarios, the key word characterizing Kyiv's attitude towards Minsk will remain "toxicity." Trust between the two countries will be restored very slowly, and political dialogue will remain limited for a long time.

What All This Means for Europe

For the European Union, researchers identify four main challenges.

The first is military. Belarusian territory is already being used by Russia as an element of its military infrastructure. After the war ends, this role could increase.

This is not just about potential troops or missiles. Belarus has already become a platform for hybrid threats — organized migration, information operations, cyberattacks, and provocations on the EU borders.

The second challenge is the gradual loss of Belarusian subjectivity. If Western attention is focused exclusively on Russia and Ukraine, Belarus could become permanently entrenched in the Russian political, economic, and information space.

The third is a split among Western allies. The authors of the study do not rule out that after the war ends, the approaches of the USA and the European Union to Belarus may begin to diverge. According to their assessments, Washington may opt for a more pragmatic dialogue with Minsk. For the USA, Belarus could become one element of broader negotiations with Russia regarding the future security architecture in Europe.

The European Union, on the contrary, may maintain a stricter approach. For many of its countries, primarily Poland and the Baltic states, Belarus remains a direct source of threats — from Russia's military presence to migratory pressure and other hybrid attacks on the borders. If these approaches truly diverge, Lukashenka may try to exploit these contradictions to his advantage.

And finally, the fourth threat is Belarus's disappearance from the international agenda. If, after the war ends, the West's primary attention is focused on relations with Russia and the reconstruction of Ukraine, the Belarusian crisis may recede into the background. According to experts, this scenario would be one of the most dangerous, as it would allow Minsk and Moscow, without significant external attention, to finally consolidate the current model of relations.

What All This Could Mean for Belarusians

Reading the study in its entirety, one can observe that it does not promise Belarusians quick good news. Even under the most favorable development of events, the authors do not expect either rapid democratization of the country or a sharp weakening of Russian influence. But this does not mean that after the war ends, the lives of Belarusians cannot change.

Павялічыць

Border of Belarus and Lithuania. Illustrative photo

First of all, it's about restoring contacts with Europe. Over the past five years, it has become much harder for Belarusians to obtain Schengen visas, travel, and maintain professional and personal ties with EU countries. Closed border crossings, reduced consular services, and the cancellation of rail and air links have effectively made Belarus much more isolated than it was just a few years ago.

According to the study's authors, this should be one of the first directions for the European Union's work after the war ends.

This is not about normalizing relations with the Belarusian authorities. On the contrary, the researchers propose separating policy towards the regime from policy towards Belarusian society.

If the security situation allows, Europe could gradually restore its consular presence in Belarus, issue more multiple-entry long-term visas, open new checkpoints, and restore railway connections with neighboring countries.

Such steps, analysts believe, should be seen as an investment in Belarusian society, rather than through the prism of concessions to Lukashenka.

They proceed from a simple logic: the less Belarusians interact with Europe, the more the country will integrate into the Russian political, educational, and informational space.

Researchers also consider it no less important to maintain support for Belarusian democratic forces. In their opinion, after the war ends, there is a risk that international attention will shift exclusively to relations with official Minsk. If this happens, Lukashenka would effectively gain a monopoly on representing Belarus abroad.

To prevent this, representatives of democratic forces should continue to participate in international discussions — on democracy, post-war security, the future of the region, and the development of Belarus.

After the War, the Main Question Will Be Different

For the past few years, Belarus has been discussed mainly in one context: whether it would enter the war against Ukraine. The study proposes looking a bit further.

If hostilities truly end, the main question will be different: will Belarus ever be able to escape Russia's orbit and return to the European security space, or will its dependence on Moscow only intensify after the war? However, experts did not consider the scenario of an internal explosion in Russia, although signs of an internal crisis have emerged. Nor did they consider the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons.

In any case, for Belarus, the end of the war will mark the beginning of a new stage. And how Minsk, Moscow, Brussels, and Washington, as well as — and first and foremost — Belarusian society, act at that moment will determine both the future of Belarus and the security of Eastern Europe.

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