When would Kyiv consider it has the right to strike Belarusian oil refineries? Ukrainian expert named the main condition

Over the past two years, Ukraine has repeatedly struck Russian oil refineries, explaining that they are part of military logistics and supply fuel to the Russian army. Kyiv has repeatedly stressed: if a civilian object begins to work for the needs of aggression, it becomes a legitimate target.

Against this background, the topic of Belarusian oil refineries – the Mozyr Oil Refinery and Naftan – has recently emerged. The close military alliance between Minsk and Moscow and Kyiv's recent statements about the use of Belarusian territory to support Russian attacks raise the question of whether these enterprises could be considered military targets by Kyiv.

Dmytro Hramakov, an expert at Kyiv's International Center for Countering Russian Aggression, stated in an interview with Nasha Niva that from Ukraine's perspective, such a possibility already exists. However, according to him, there is one fundamental condition.

"As soon as the first liter of fuel is poured into a Russian tank"

According to the expert, the decisive factor is whether the products of Belarusian oil refineries are used for the needs of the Russian army.

"If the products of Belarusian oil refineries are used to refuel Russian military equipment involved in aggression against Ukraine, these facilities become legitimate military targets," Hramakov believes.

He emphasizes that this refers both to equipment that can operate from Belarusian territory and to equipment in adjacent sectors of the front.

"Belarus is currently being used by Russia as an economic booster and a staging ground for supporting aggression against Ukraine. As soon as the first liter of fuel is poured into a Russian tank, that is already grounds to consider the oil refinery a legitimate military target," says the expert.

He clarifies that this can be confirmed by commercial contracts.

"If contracts are concluded directly with the Russian Ministry of Defense, it will be evident that this fuel is not being purchased for peaceful purposes," says Dmytro Hramakov.

Belarus is already part of the front

One of the main arguments against strikes on Belarusian territory is often cited as the risk of opening a second front.

However, Hramakov believes that this argument is not relevant for Ukraine.

"For Ukraine, there is no first or second front. The front has existed since February 24, 2022, and the Belarusian border has long been part of it. The question is only about the intensity of hostilities in different sectors," he says.

According to the expert, Ukraine is indeed not interested in expanding hostilities in the Belarusian direction. But this cannot be a deterrent if support for the Russian army continues through Belarus.

"The threat from economic support for Russian troops may be greater than the risks associated with strikes on these facilities," he believes.

"These are not strikes on Belarus, but on Russian interests"

At the same time, the expert emphasizes that the main threat to Ukraine is not the Belarusian army.

In his opinion, the Belarusian army is currently not ready for large-scale offensive operations due to a lack of combat experience, equipment, and human resources.

"We do not consider Belarus itself as the main threat. For us, the threat is the Russian presence on the territory of Belarus and the Russian interests being realized here," Hramakov explains.

That is why he refers to possible strikes on Belarusian oil refineries not as strikes on Belarus as a state, but on Russian military infrastructure.

"Any enterprise that supports Russian aggression against Ukraine is considered a legitimate military target," the expert states.

Павялічыць

Does international law permit this?

According to Hramakov, from a legal standpoint, such actions can be justified. After Belarus provided its territory to Russia for an attack on Ukraine at the beginning of the war, its status in the conflict changed.

"February 24, 2022, effectively defined Belarus as an accomplice to aggression. If support continues, the relevant facilities can be considered legitimate military targets. From the perspective of international law, this is legitimate," the expert assures.

He also does not expect fundamental objections from Ukraine's Western partners.

"Belarus as a staging ground for Russian aggression is not needed by any of its neighbors. Therefore, I do not think anyone will oppose eliminating this threat by available means," he says.

What could lead to escalation?

According to Hramakov, the issue of strikes on Belarusian facilities depends on Minsk's policy. He emphasizes that for Ukraine itself, it is already meaningless to talk about new escalation.

"We are already in a state of war. We have nowhere left to escalate," says the expert.

According to him, Belarus participates in the war not only by providing its territory to Russia. He lists several dimensions of this participation: economic cooperation, information confrontation, cyberattacks which, according to the Ukrainian side, were carried out from Belarusian territory, as well as diplomatic support for Moscow.

"Belarus has not condemned Russian aggression at the international level. In economic, informational, cybernetic, and diplomatic dimensions, it is already participating in this war. Therefore, it's not about a new escalation, but about whether another dimension of this war will open up," the expert concludes.

The Belarusian authorities consistently deny accusations of direct involvement in the war against Ukraine. Alexander Lukashenka emphasized that Belarusian military personnel are not participating in hostilities and stated that Belarus seeks to prevent further escalation of the conflict. According to him, Minsk has no intention of "getting involved in someone else's war," and all the country's actions are exclusively defensive and related to the need to guarantee its own security. Lukashenka also claimed that he warned the Ukrainian side not to try to "drag Belarus into the war" and assured that "no military actions from Belarus should be expected."

At the same time, the Belarusian authorities do not deny close military cooperation with Russia within the framework of the so-called Union State, conduct joint exercises, refer to the deployment of Russian military infrastructure as an element of deterrence and defense, and regularly declare coordination of actions with Moscow.

Thus, the positions of Minsk and Kyiv fundamentally diverge in assessing Belarus's role in the war.

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